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KADY S. HUFF

SPENDING CLAUSE—GRAVE DECEPTIONS: REMEDYING CEMETERY
MISFEASANCE THROUGH CONGRESS’S CONDITIONAL SPENDING POWER
IN THE AFTERMATH OF AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LITIGATION
Good friend, for Jesus’ sake forbeare
To digg the dust enclosed heare;
Blest be the man that spares these stones,
1
And curst be he that moves my bones.

INTRODUCTION
The excavation and desecration of sepulchral remains were
common practices among grave-robbers in Shakespeare’s era.2
However, many are unaware that these nefarious practices continue
today at the behest of profit-driven cemetarians.3 In 1978, Matthew
Williams,4 a loving father, was laid to rest in Burr Oak Cemetery.5
1. SCOTT FREDERICK SURTEES, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OF STRATFORD-ON-AVON:
HIS EPITAPH UNEARTHED AND THE AUTHOR OF THE PLAYS RUN TO GROUND 11 (1888)
(denoting William Shakespeare’s Epitaph); see CHRISTY DESMET & ROBERT SAWYER,
SHAKESPEARE AND APPROPRIATION 16 (2002) (noting the bard’s fear of grave robbers:
“[S]hakespeare was acutely aware of the ironic and violent fate a poet’s [grave] might
suffer . . . .”).
2. See KEVERNE SMITH, SHAKESPEARE AND SON: A JOURNEY IN WRITING AND
GRIEVING 97 (2011) (explaining that in Renaissance England, “[i]t was not uncommon for
bones to be moved when a new grave was being dug; in most cases it seems that bones that
were in the way were put to one side . . . while the new grave was being dug, and then
reburied.” Thus, Shakespeare, in his final mark, cursed all those who wished to move his
bones).
3. For purposes of this Note, a cemetarian is one who owns, operates, or apparently
controls a cemetery.
4. Oversight of Cemeteries and Other Funeral Services: Who’s in Charge? Hearing on
H.R. 3655 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (Statement of Roxie Williams)
[hereinafter Statement of Roxie Williams], available at http://democrats.energycommerce.hou
se.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final-Transcript-CTCP-Oversight-Cemetaries-Funeral-Se
rvices-2009-7-27.pdf; see also Company Overview of Perpetua-Burr Oak Holdings of Illinois
LLC, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:31 AM), http://investing.businessweek.
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=106785066 (explaining that Burr Oak
Cemetery is owned by Perpetua-Burr Oak Holdings and is a limited liability company located
in Alsip, Illinois). The memorial garden is known as one of the few cemeteries that targets the
burial needs of the African-American community and is renowned as the final resting place of
many notable and historic figures including Emmitt Till, among others. See Burr Oak History,
BURR OAK CEMETERY, http://theburroakcemetery.com/burr-oak-history/ (last visited May 6,
2014).
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Matthew’s death was unexpected and shocked his wife and young
children.6 In hopes of paying final respects, his family selflessly scraped
together enough money to purchase a beautiful headstone.7 But, when
Matthew’s children visit his grave today, the headstone that his family
struggled to purchase in 1978 is missing, and Matthew’s plot no longer
exists.8
A 2009 investigation into the sprawling 159-acre cemetery revealed
that groundskeepers had uprooted more than 300 bodies from their final
resting places to make room for new graves.9 To carry out this plan,
employees destroyed expensive caskets and sentimental headstones—
and most egregiously—discarded beloved human remains into a mass
grave known as the “cemetery dump.”10 Cook County Sheriff and lead
investigator, Tom Dart, noted “we found femurs, skulls, parts of jaws,
just lying out in the open.”11 For five years, cemetery officials had been
removing remains from burial plots and reselling them to unsuspecting
consumers—for profit.12 Burr Oak officials were unable to provide
authorities with adequate records and had no knowledge of which
remains had been moved.13 As a result, families have been searching the
burial grounds for their loved ones for years.14
In the United States, seventy-three percent of deaths each year
result in traditional casket burials,15 yet the cemetery industry remains
unregulated at the federal level.16 When a tragedy occurs, bereaved

5. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 16.
6. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 18-19.
7. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 18-19.
8. See Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4, at 20.
9. Cemeteries Draw Complaints, CBS NEWS-60 MINUTES (May 17, 2012), http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57436612/cemeteries-draw-complaints/.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. On other occasions, groundskeepers were ordered to “double stack” remains to
maximize burial space. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Ryan Mark et. al., Burr Oak Cemetery: Browse the headstones, CHI. TRIB., July
30, 2009, http://archive.is/HQQkE (listing pictures of all the unclaimed headstones found in
the aftermath of the Burr Oak scandal).
15. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-65, DEATH SERVICES: STATE
REGULATION OF THE DEATH CARE INDUSTRY VARIES AND OFFICIALS HAVE MIXED VIEWS
ON NEED FOR FURTHER FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 7 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, DEATH
SERVICES] (denoting that the National Center for Health Statistics preliminary data shows that
there were approximately 2,473,018 deaths in 2008 and 2,436,682 deaths in 2009).
16. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2013) (setting forth the “Funeral Rule,” but failing
to include independent cemetery operations unrelated to the direct operation of a funeral
home).

KADY S. HUFF

2014]

REMEDYING CEMETARY MISFEASANCE

439

consumers have little time to investigate cemeteries or bargain-shop for
reasonably priced burial goods and services.17 As a result, consumers
are denied the opportunity to use the same diligence traditionally
practiced in more usual transactions.18
Congress recognized the unique characteristics of the death care
trade and conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission the authority to
regulate funeral providers through the Funeral Rule.19 While the
Funeral Rule affords comprehensive consumer price protections for
consumers who patronize the funeral industry,20 it affords no such
protections to consumers in the cemetery industry.21 This lack of
oversight has led to the possibility of misfeasance and negligent
mismanagement.22
This Note argues that the federal government should intervene
using its constitutional power to spend, and encourage states to adopt
These
“Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines.”23
guidelines seek to ensure that cemetery operations—like other trades—

17. An AARP Report explains that, at most, people who purchased burial plots may
have looked at one other plot before making the final selection. See RACHELLE CUMMINS,
AARP KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, AARP FINANCIAL PROTECTION: NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND
FOR-PROFIT CEMETERIES SURVEY 4 (2000), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consu
me/cemetery_survey.pdf.
18. See Grief, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/dis
ease/grief/overview (last visited May 14, 2014).
19. See Funeral Rule 16 C.F.R. § 453.1 (2013).
20. For the purposes of this Note the funeral industry provides funeral services. The
term “funeral services” is defined as any service which may be used to: “(1) [c]are for and
prepare deceased human bodies for burial, cremation or other final disposition; and (2)
[a]rrange, supervise or conduct the funeral ceremony or the final disposition of deceased
human bodies.” Id. § 453.1(j). A “funeral provider” is defined as any “person, partnership or
corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services to the public.” Id. §
453.1(i).
21. “Traditionally, the Rule has not applied to cemeteries because while cemeteries
often offer funeral goods and a funeral ceremony, as a general matter, they do not prepare
deceased bodies for burial and so do not meet the definition of ‘funeral provider.’” See
Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 73 Fed. Reg.
13740, 13744 (Mar. 14, 2008).
22. “Misfeasance is commonly defined as the improper performance of an act that one
may lawfully do.” Andrew L. Weitz, Contractor Duty to Third Parties Not in Privity: A
Quasi-Tort Solution to the Vexing Problem of Victims of Nonfeasance, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
593, 627 n.40 (1997). For the purposes of this Note, misfeasance is highlighted by
cemetarians mismanaging burial grounds, overcharging bereaved consumers for goods and
services, or intentionally failing to disclose itemized pricing information. Burr Oak is an
extreme example offered to depict the severity of the abuses in the cemetery industry and is an
example of malfeasance as the cemetery provider(s) in question had no legal right to remove
remains from entombed graves.
23. See infra App. A.
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are legally bound to provide the most basic consumer protections.24
Part I of this Note introduces the Funeral Rule and explains why the
FTC does not have jurisdiction to regulate the cemetery industry. Part II
examines the patchwork of state regulations that currently exist and
emphasizes the need for uniformity within the industry. Part III sets
forth a conditional spending proposal under the confines of National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, (NFIB).25 This
section recommends Congress condition an appropriate percentage of the
Medicaid grant on states’ compliance with the proposed Minimum
Guidelines. Part IV applies the test set forth in NFIB to this proposal.
Finally, Part V offers an alternative proposal, contending that Congress
should condition the individual receipt of the Medicaid burial set-aside
on state compliance with the above-mentioned guidelines.
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CANNOT UNDERTAKE CEMETERY
REGULATION
In the United States, the FTC is the enforcement body responsible
for regulating unfair and deceptive trade practices.26 While the FTC has
the authority to respond to consumer complaints against businesses and
trade associations,27 its authority does not extend to the cemetery
industry.28 Part A of this Section provides a comprehensive history of
the FTC’s Funeral Rule and emphasizes the absence of the cemetery
industry from the Rule. Part B sets forth the limitations of the FTC’s
agency authority and argues that the FTC does not have jurisdiction to
regulate the cemetery industry or other large non-profit markets.

24. “Tom Dart . . . observe[d] that manicurists and barbers must endure more regulatory
hurdles than most cemetery operators, including . . . managers and groundskeepers.” Steven
Gray, Outside Chicago, a Grim Tale of Unearthed Graves, TIME U.S., July 11, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1910036,00.html#ixzz2AAADvZsY
(explaining that many states have oversight bodies for trades such as manicurists, but “there is
no single agency, government or independent, that keeps up-to-date records of how many
human bodies are buried or cremated on a cemetery’s grounds or the names of the buried”).
25. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) [hereinafter
“NFIB”]. This case is also known as the “Obamacare” case.
26. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012) (showing the establishment of the FTC
and its jurisdictional authority); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (noting the FTC is empowered to prevent
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce”); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of
Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 227-30
(1980).
27. See supra note 26 and statutes cited therein.
28. See supra note 26 and statutes cited therein.
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A. The History of the Funeral Rule
In the 1980s, many complaints began to surface from bereaved
consumers alleging that unscrupulous funeral providers were deceiving
and overcharging consumers resulting in profiteering29 and
mismanagement.30 Many consumers were coerced into paying excessive
prices for funeral services due to funeral providers who refused to
deliver adequate pricing information.31 Further, grieving consumers are
easy prey for providers seeking to sell an abundance of goods. For
example, pre-Funeral Rule, providers were adding unnecessary goods
and services into bundled funeral packages and were misrepresenting the
need for particular goods under state and federal laws.32 These practices
were causing consumers “to pay higher than competitive prices for the
items they purchase[d].”33
Aware of these complaints, the FTC conducted an extensive
investigation into the funeral industry. The Commission found that
patrons of the industry “are often unable to make careful, informed
decisions regarding funeral transactions.”34 The investigation further
revealed that bereaved consumers are “highly vulnerable to unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and that many funeral providers were
unlawfully taking advantage of their customers.”35 In 1984 The FTC
promulgated the Funeral Rule to counteract these consumer abuses and
encourage transparent pricing and management. Amended in 1994,36 the
rule seeks to protect consumers from funeral industry profiteering and
29. Jim Abrams, Report Says Government Lacks Control of Funeral Industry,
SARASOTA-HERALD TRIB., Oct. 22, 1999, at 7D; see also Profiteer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profiteer (last visited May 14,
2014) (defining the term profiteer as “one who makes what is considered an unreasonable
profit especially on the sale of essential goods during times of emergency”).
30. See Fred S. McChesney, Consumer Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law:
Empirical Evidence from the FTC Funeral Rule, 7 J.L. & POL. 1, 7 (1990) (noting the refusal
of many funeral homes to provide price information to consumers and the use of lump-sum
pricing makes it impossible for patrons to discern the hidden cost of the components of
complex funeral package).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg 42,260, 42,269 (Sept. 24, 1982));
see also The Bereaved Consumer Bill of Rights: Hearing on H.R. 3655 Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
111th Cong. 1-2 (2010) (statement of
Representative Bobby Rush), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg76005/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg76005.pdf.
34. Funeral Consumer Alliance, Inc. v. F.T.C., 481 F.3d 860, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(citing Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260, 42,265-66 (Sept. 24, 1982)).
35. Id.
36. Funeral Industry Practices Trade Regulation Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 1592, 1611 (Jan.
11, 1994) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 453).
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deceptive trade tactics by imposing a series of regulations on funeral
providers in areas such as fraud and misrepresentation, required vs. nonrequired services, open price disclosures, and retention of documents.37
Pursuant to the Rule, it is an unfair or deceptive act for funeral providers
to:
[F]ail to furnish accurate price information disclosing the cost to the
purchaser for each of the specific funeral goods and funeral services
used in connection with the disposition of deceased human bodies,
including at least the price of embalming, transportation of remains,
use of facilities, caskets, outer burial containers, immediate burials,
or direct cremations, to persons inquiring about the purchase of
38
funerals.

This applies whether the consumer inquires via telephone or in
person.39 Consumers are encouraged to pick and choose the services
they need as opposed to services providers may hide in bundled sales
packages in an attempt to mask the cost of individual funeral goods.40
To encourage this transparency, the Funeral Rule also mandates that
consumers be given a General Price List,41 which must, in a “clear and
conspicuous manner,” list the prices of all available goods and
services.42 This aids consumers in making informed decisions when
patronizing funeral homes. Further, providers are not allowed to refuse
services to a consumer because he or she has contracted with a thirdparty vendor for goods such as caskets or burial containers.43
To ensure that consumers receive the goods contracted for, the
Funeral Rule orders that funeral homes provide a written itemized
receipt showing exactly what was purchased and the price of each item.44
By providing this receipt, consumers are able to review and have record
of their purchase. While the government saw the need to prevent the
above mentioned abuses, consumers who patronize the cemetery

37. 16 C.F.R. § 453.1(i) (2013); Elizabeth Howell Boldt, Note, Nail in the Coffin: Can
Elderly Americans Afford to Die?, 21 ELDER L.J. 149, 161 (2013).
38. 16 C.F.R. § 453.2(a).
39. Id. § 453.2(b)(1).
40. Id.
41. For the purposes of this Note, a General Price List is “a printed or typewritten price
list for retention to persons who inquire in person about the funeral goods, funeral services or
prices of funeral goods or services offered by the funeral provider.” Id. § 453.2(4)(iA)(1)-(3).
42. Id. § 453.2(b)(4). This list must also be provided to consumers who inquire about
prices via telephone.
43. Id. § 453.4(b)(10).
44. Id. § 453.2 (b)(5)(i).
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industry and who face the exact hardships45 are excluded from the rule
and left with no federal protection against these abuses.46
In 2011, Representative Bobby Rush of Illinois introduced the
Bereaved Consumer Bill of Rights Act to the United States House of
Representatives.47 The Bill sought to extend FTC oversight to prevent
unfair and deceptive trade practices in the cemetery industry.48
Ultimately, after its introduction, the bill was sent to the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce where it died by the close of the
112th Congress. To date, no similar bills have been proposed.49 While
the bill sought to extend the Funeral Rule to the cemetery industry, the
FTC is not the ideal agency to take on this task.50
B. Why the FTC Cannot Regulate the Cemetery Industry
The abuses in the cemetery industry are similar to those that once
existed in the funeral industry. As a result, lawmakers and industry
professionals argue that the Funeral Rule should be expanded to account
for the cemetery industry.51 This expansion would include adequate
price lists, itemized bills, and organized record keeping.52 Further,
cemetarians are now selling goods and services outside of the traditional
scope of business and should be regulated in some capacity.53 In
particular, cemeteries have transformed from “sellers of burial plots to
one-stop, full-service funeral providers, competing against funeral
homes for sales of every conceivable funeral good.”54 Funeral industry
professionals argue that excluding cemetarians from federal regulation
45. As mentioned above, these hardships include the inability to make informed
purchasing decisions, emotional distress, lack of familiarity with the industry, and time
constraints. Since the funeral industry and the cemetery industry are so similar, these
hardships are consistent for both.
46. See generally Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry
Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 13740 (Mar. 14, 2008).
47. Bereaved Consumer’s Bill of Rights, H.R. 3655, 111th Cong. (2009) reintroduced
as Bereaved Consumer’s Bill of Rights Act of 2011, H.R. 900, 112th Cong. (2011).
48. Id.
49. H.R. 900, 112th Cong. (2011).
50. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,
73 Fed. Reg.13740 (Mar. 14, 2008).
51. Id. at 13741-2.
52. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2013).
53. See, e.g., Services, SPRINGFIELD CEMETERY & CREMATORY, http://www.rocheinter
net.com/~spce/design/?lv=8 (last visited May 14, 2014) (noting that this Springfield,
Massachusetts cemetery offers a number of services including cremation, graveside, and
chapel services).
54. Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, 73
Fed. Reg. at 13744 (quoting National Selected Morticians (NSM), Comment A-54, at 6-8).
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promotes unfair market conditions.55
Since the Funeral Rule’s inception, there has been a steady increase
in national conglomerates acquiring private cemeteries.56 This has
resulted in an influx of cross-competitors that are not subject to industry
regulation.57 As a result, nearly all of the funeral providers and other
industry participants who partook in the FTC’s notice and comment
period “urged the Commission to ‘level the playing field.’”58
1. The FTC Has Limited Jurisdiction
In 2008, during the most recent notice and comment period for the
Funeral Rule, the FTC rebuffed hundreds of comments vying for the
expansion of the Rule.59 The FTC reasoned that it could not create a
new cemetery rule or expand the Funeral Rule because of jurisdictional
limitations.60 The FTC Act extends the FTC’s jurisdiction only to
corporations “organized to carry on business for [their] own profit or that
of [their] members. . . .”61 Since a vast majority of cemeteries are
organized as non-profits, any extension of the FTC’s jurisdiction “would
raise serious jurisdictional issues concerning the status of nonprofit
entities under FTC regulation.”62
2. Ramifications of Expanding the FTC’s Jurisdiction
Extending the FTC’s jurisdiction to cover non-profit organizations
would be problematic. According to the IRS, “[t]here are reported to be
between 75,000 and 100,000 cemeteries in the United States. Most of
[which] are tax exempt organizations.”63 These entities are predicted to
outnumber the nation’s estimated 7,500 for-profit cemeteries by at least

55. Id. For example, NSM, a not-for-profit, international trade association of
independent, privately owned and operated funeral homes, has argued that they are operating
in an uneven playing field.
56. Michael B. Sauter & Jon Ogg, 10 Companies that Control the $15 Billion Death
Industry in America, TOPSTOCKANALYSTS (Jan. 17, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.topstockana
lysts.com/index.php/2011/01/17/10-companies-that-control-the-15-billion-death-industry-in-a
merica/.
57. See Irwin W. Shipper, Request for Comments Concerning the Trade
Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices 16 CFR Part 453, International Cemetery and
Funeral Association (ICFA), Comment A-38, [hereinafter ICFA Comment].
58. 73 Fed. Reg. at 13744 (noting cemetarians provide almost identical goods and
services, yet are given a distinct market advantage).
59. Id. at 13741-2.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C § 44 (2012).
62. See ICFA Comment, supra note 57.
63. See ICFA Comment, supra note 57.
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three to one.64 To further this point, some states strictly prohibit forprofit cemetery entities from operating within state borders.65 The FTC
and various industry participants reasoned that regulating only for-profit
cemeteries would not accomplish the major premise of the Act.66 Only a
relatively small number of cemeteries would be affected and there would
be substantial confusion in distinguishing non-profit from for-profit
entities.67
Further, expanding the scope of the FTC Act or Funeral Rule
would bestow upon the FTC over 400,000 new entities to regulate.68
This would spread the FTC’s enforcement capabilities very thin.69 As a
result, the effectiveness of the Funeral Rule might be compromised.
This, along with the jurisdictional dilemma, makes the FTC an
inappropriate regulatory body for the cemetery industry.
II. A PATCHWORK OF STATE REGULATION HAS LED TO GRAVE ABUSES
WITHIN THE CEMETERY INDUSTRY
Currently the cemetery industry is regulated (if at all) solely at the
state level.70 However, states vary dramatically in the laws and
regulations that they implement and enforce.71 This Section argues that
the lack of uniformity and industry oversight has led to a disparity in
consumer protections across the U.S.72 Scandals, like Burr Oak, sparked
the interest of the Government Accountability Office (GAO),73 which
conducted a nationwide survey concerning current state regulation of the

64. See ICFA Comment, supra note 57.
65. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,
73 Fed. Reg. at 13745; see also GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 11-12 (noting that
these states include Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, New York, and
Wyoming).
66. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,
73 Fed. Reg. at 13745.
67. Id.
68. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,
73 Fed. Reg. at 13740.
69. See generally id.
70. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1.
71. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1.
72. Cemeteries Draw Complaints, supra note 9.
73. See About the GAO, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited May
7, 2014) (“The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan
agency that works for Congress . . . . [the] GAO investigates how the federal government
spends taxpayer dollars . . . . [the mission of the GAO] is to support . . . Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve . . . performance and ensure the
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.”).
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death care industry.74 This federal inquiry is prima facie evidence that
the unregulated cemetery industry has been, and continues to be a
problem of federal concern.
Part A of this Section analyzes the hardships states face in
attempting to regulate cemeteries within state borders and highlights
inconsistencies among state regulators.75 Part B draws comparisons
between Iowa, which has a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and
Colorado, which has no comprehensive state regulatory body. This Part
seeks to show the varying levels of cemetery regulation across the fifty
states and calls for uniformity among them.
A. The 2011 GAO Report Unearthed Inconsistencies Among State
Regulators
Widespread media coverage of cemetery mismanagement led the
GAO to review federal involvement within the death care industry.76
The focus of this report was how states regulate the industry and whether
there is a need for additional regulation.77 The GAO found that while
most states reported having regulations in place for some cemeteries, no
state reported regulating all cemeteries within its borders.78 One
problem is that the number of cemeteries operating within a particular
state is not always known, and often no records are kept at either the
state or municipal levels.79
Further, there are limited licensing
requirements across the nation.80 While all funeral providers are
required to be licensed by federal law, twenty of the thirty-seven states
surveyed reported that they do not require cemetery operators to be
licensed and no annual inspections were necessary of cemetery
premises.81
74. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1.
75. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1
76. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1
77. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 1
78. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 16.
79. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. To highlight this point, “18 of the 37
states surveyed noted that they did not maintain data on the number of cemeteries that operate
within the state’s borders.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. Further, “only five
states were able to provide comprehensive data on the number of cemeteries within their state.
The report explained that the states contained a number of cemeteries ranging from 124 to
3,600.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17.
80. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17 Noting, “11 [states] reported that
some but not all cemetery operators are required to be licensed, 1 reported that all are required
to be licensed, and 5 checked ‘No response.’ State regulators reported that licenses were
required to be renewed at various frequencies, if at all.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note
15, at 17.
81. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. With respect to inspection, “21 of
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With lack of inspections in many states, consumer protection issues
go unnoticed and violations become difficult to track.82 Of the thirtyfour states that responded to this issue on the GAO’s survey, only
eighteen reported tracking violations of cemeteries.83 Of those states that
track cemetery misconduct, the most frequent violations included those
related to “(1) record keeping, (2) maintenance, (3) unprofessional
conduct, and (4) licensing.”84 The GAO, concluded, “[t]he extent to
which the federal and state governments regulate . . . cemeteries . . .
varies.”85 This variance demonstrates the need for regulatory unity
within the industry.
B. Contrasting State Cemetery Laws: From Comprehensive to NonExistent
States have proven unsuccessful in regulating cemeteries. This
patchwork level of regulation has resulted in some states that have
comprehensive control over the industry, while others have no
regulations at all.
1. Comprehensive Regulations: The Iowa Cemetery Act
Iowa is one of the few states to enact comprehensive state cemetery
law.86 For example, the Iowa Cemetery Act87 mandates widespread
cemetery inspections.88 Under the Act, inspectors examine “the books,
accounts, papers, correspondence, memoranda, purchase agreements,
files, or other documents or records of the cemetery.”89 If it is found that
a cemetarian “is engaged or about to be engaged”90 in an activity
prohibited under the Act, the cemetarian may be required to cease and
desist from engaging in such practice and is subject to civil penalties.91

the 37 state regulators who responded to this issue . . . reported that inspections of cemeteries
were not required, and those that did require them reported that the frequency of the required
inspections varied.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 17. “The 12 state inspectors
who responded to our survey question regarding the number of inspectors available to inspect
cemeteries reported having between zero and nine inspectors.” GAO, DEATH SERVICES,
supra note 15, at 18.
82. See generally Statement of Roxie Williams, supra note 4.
83. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15.
84. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15 at 18.
85. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 18.
86. See generally IOWA CODE § 523I.101 (2011).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 523I.202(1)(d).
90. Id. § 523I.203.
91. Id.
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Unlike other states that focus on land based regulations for cemeteries,92
Iowa focuses on consumer protection.93
In-line with the above assertion, the Act deems it unlawful for a
cemetarian to misrepresent state or federal law.94 This occurs when a
cemetarian implies that services such as embalming are required by law.
This is typically an attempt to coerce consumers into making
unnecessary purchases. Further, the Act prohibits cemetarians from
conspiring to defraud consumers in connection with “the sale of
memorials, memorialization, opening and closing services, scattering
services, interment rights, or a combination thereof.”95 In states lacking
similar provisions, cemetarians are more likely to misrepresent services
to consumers because they remain unchecked by law.96
The Act also encourages full disclosure of records and burial plot
placements. For example, there is a record keeping provision, which
requires cemeteries to record the name, addresses, and date of purchase
associated with each plot.97 Further, each cemetery is responsible for
establishing, “[a] unique numeric or alphanumeric identifier that identify
the location of each interment space sold by the cemetery.”98 Along with
this, a cemetarian must fully disclose all fees required for services such
as inurnment,99 interment,100 and entombment101 of human remains.102
While Iowa’s statutory scheme is exemplary, many states are very far
behind in implementing these types of measures, leaving consumers to
fend for themselves in purchasing burial goods.103
2. No State Regulation: Colorado
Colorado is one state that has historically lacked cemetery

92. See generally id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 523I.209-.211.
95. Id. § 523I.211.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 523I.311.
98. Id.
99. Funeral Terms and Contact Information, FTC (July 2012), http://www.consumer.ftc
.gov/articles/0306-funeral-terms-and-contact-information (defining inurnment as “[t]he
placing of cremated remains in an urn”).
100. See id. (defining internment as “[t]he burial of a corpse in a grave or tomb,
typically with funeral rites”).
101. See id. (defining entombment as “[b]urial in the ground, inurnment or
entombment”).
102. IOWA CODE § 523I.301.
103. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 61.
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regulation.104 While it has full consumer protection provisions within its
“Mortuary Science Code,”105 no provision extends to cemeteries.106
Because Colorado state law allows residents to care for the dead with
very few limitations,107 cemetarians who operate in the state are less
restricted than those operating in other states.108 For example, Service
Corporation International (SCI)109 owns and operates over seventeen
cemeteries in the state.110 This is because the only regulations specific to
the cemetery industry are local and municipal zoning ordinances.111
There are no laws addressing record keeping or inspections of
cemeteries. In fact, the Funeral Board for the State of Colorado no
longer exists.112
In late 2012, Colorado enacted a statute to address grievances made
at non-profit cemeteries.113 The law aims to make non-profit cemetery
boards transparent and accountable to bereaved consumers.114 The
statute requires non-profit cemetery operators to keep records of any
“grave space, niche, or crypt.”115 These records must include an annual
written report “setting forth the number of interments, internments and
entombments maintained by the non-profit cemetery.”116
The
corporation must maintain a copy of the minutes of all board meetings
for three preceding years, a copy of periodic corporate filings for the
104. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 61.
105. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-54-106 (2011). The Colorado Mortuary Sciences Code
seeks consumer protection for the funeral industry. The given protections include: full
disclosure of prices and services offered, itemized general price lists, and prohibition of legal
misrepresentations.
106. GAO, DEATH SERVICES, supra note 15, at 62 (noting in Colorado, “[c]emeteries
are not regulated at the state level”).
107. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-54-106.
108. Id.
109. Find A Local Provider, SERV. CORP. INT’L, http://www.sci-corp.com/SCICORP/Fi
ndLocalProvider.aspx?alias=0201 (last visited May 9, 2014).
110. Id.
111. See generally id.
112. See Karen E. Crummy, Trinidad Cemetery’s Actions and Finances Under
Investigation, DENVER POST, Feb. 5, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/investigat
ions/ci_19895937. The public was outraged when Trinidad Catholic Cemetery was caught
dumping headstones and memorial flags behind its facility. It was further discovered that the
board of the Catholic cemetery filed inaccurate tax documents. In another case, the Roselawn
Cemetery allegedly extorted over $800,000 from it perpetual care fund and then told bereaved
consumers that the sum was lost in the stock market. Id.
113. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-47-101 (2012) (amended by Laws 1012, Ch.
229, § 1 eff. Aug. 8, 2012).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 7-47-101 (1).
116. Id. § 7-47-101 (1)(a).
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preceding three years, and a copy of the corporation’s Internal Revenue
Form 990 for the preceding three years.117 Further, under the law, the
non-profit cemetery boards must include at least one person who owns
or has a property interest in a grave or burial space.118 This gives
appointed consumers the ability to attend meetings, review minutes, and
inspect the otherwise confidential financial records of the subject
cemetery.119 If the board denies access to the property or the records
then a court order may be obtained and the cemetery will be held
accountable for attorney’s fees.120 This enforcement mechanism will
encourage non-profit cemetarians to operate in an open and obvious
manner, significantly diminishing the likelihood of mismanagement. At
the very least, the records will be open to the public.
Iowa and Colorado are two examples of states with vastly different
regulatory schemes for the cemetery industry. This inconsistency and
unpredictability of state laws across the United States is evidence that a
uniform scheme is needed. Because cemetery regulation at the state
level has proven ineffective, the federal government must intervene
through its Spending Clause authority to regulate the industry.
III. CONDITIONAL SPENDING THROUGH THE MEDICAID GRANT:
IMPLEMENTING MINIMUM GRIEVING CONSUMER PROTECTION
GUIDELINES
Congress’s conditional spending power is enumerated in the United
States Constitution121 and allows Congress to tax and spend, so long as
the end result furthers the “general welfare” of the United States.122
Historically, Congress has used this authorization to attach conditions to
funding—even when the Constitution itself does not delegate express
authority to do so.123 For example, Congress has used its spending

117. Id. § 7-47-101(1)(b)-(f).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution empowers Congress “to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” Id.
122. See United States. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding “the power of
Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the
direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution”).
123. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (1994); see also
Amanda Staples, Note, Another Small Step in America’s Battle Against Drunk Driving: How
the Spending Clause Can Provide More Uniform Sentences for Drunk-Driving Fatalities, 46
NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 357 (2012).
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power to set national drinking ages,124 old age benefits,125 and to
establish a uniform system for collecting child support.126 Today the
government spends over 600 billion dollars per-year in federal funding,
requiring states to comply with attached conditions before
disbursement.127
The Supreme Court has continuously upheld “the use of federal
dollars to promote various policies amongst and within the states.”128 In
1987, the Court established a permissive test interpreting the spending
power.129 However, the confines of this test were recently redefined in
the 2012 term. Until National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius130 (NFIB), “no Supreme Court decision since the New Deal had
struck down an act of Congress as exceeding the federal spending
power.”131
This Section proposes that since both the FTC and individual states
are inadequate regulatory bodies, the federal government should
intervene to encourage states to adopt “Minimum Grieving Consumer
Protection Guidelines”132 utilizing Congress’s spending power. The goal
of these Guidelines is to prevent price misrepresentations and deceptive
or misleading sales practices within the industry.133 This proposal seeks
to condition the receipt of an appropriate percentage of Medicaid,134 on
the adoption of the mentioned Guidelines.135 This means if a certain
percentage of cemeteries within a state are non-compliant with the
Guidelines, the state will “opt-out” of a portion of its Medicaid funding.
This proposal is similar to the plan set forth in NFIB and tests the bounds
of that case.136
124. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
207 (1987)).
125. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639
(1937)).
126. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357 (citing Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d
1192, 1195-97 (D. Kan. 1998)).
127. See Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional Federal Grants and the
Independent Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2010).
128. See Staples, supra note 123, at 357.
129. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).
130. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012).
131. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion
in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
132. See infra App. A.
133. See infra App. A.
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2010).
135. See infra App. A.
136. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (noting “nothing in [this] opinion precludes Congress
from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care,
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Part A of this Section explains how the above mentioned
proposal—like most spending proposals—easily falls within the confines
of the permissive test set forth in South Dakota v. Dole.137 It particularly
stresses the importance of the “germaneness prong”138 and seeks to
emphasize the broad rationale of the Dole Court. Part III.B analyzes the
new test established in NFIB and highlights the substantive similarities
and differences between the proposed plan and the plan at issue in NFIB.
A. Overcoming the Broad Limitations of the Federal Spending Power:
South Dakota v. Dole
While the Supreme Court has interpreted the Spending Clause
permissively, there are important restrictions to take into consideration.
These limitations were first developed in Dole. In Dole, the State of
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a
federal statute conditioning states’ receipt of federal highway funds on
the adoption of a state drinking age of twenty-one years.139 South
Dakota, at the time, allowed people over the age of nineteen years to
purchase alcohol.140 The state’s argument, which was rejected by the
Court, was that the statute violated “the constitutional limitations on
congressional exercise of the spending power under Art. I § 8, cl. 1 of
the Constitution.”141 The Court reasoned “[i]ncident to the spending
power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.”142 However, the exercise of Congress’s spending power is
subject to certain restrictions.143
In determining these restrictions, Chief Justice Rehnquist combined
prior case law to establish an enumerated test for the constitutionality of
conditions on spending.144 The test set-forth four prongs meant to limit
federal spending powers.145 First, the spending must be in pursuit of the
general welfare.146 Second, the condition must be unambiguous and
and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use”).
137. See generally 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (explaining that “[t]he spending power is
of course not unlimited . . . but is instead subject to several general restrictions”).
138. See infra Part A, Section 1 and 2.
139. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 203.
140. Id. at 205.
141. Id. at 203.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See also Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 5 n.26; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08
(setting forth said enumerated test).
145. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
146. Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
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provide the states with clear notice “of the consequences of their
participation.”147 In other words, the states must have the tools to make
a knowledgeable choice whether to accept or reject federal grant money.
Third, the conditions placed on the funds must be related or germane to
the federal goals of the grant affected.148 This means there must be a
rational connection between the purpose of the grant and the conditions
attached to the grant. Finally, “other constitutional provisions may [not]
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.”149
While this test may seem comprehensive, it has been interpreted
leniently.150 Until NFIB, no court had invalidated funding proposals
under the Dole test.151 Today, the outer limits of the requirements
remain undefined by the courts.152
For example, courts have
consistently viewed three of the four prongs as implicit,153 while the
“germaneness” or “relatedness” prong has received some scrutiny by the
courts.154 The Supreme Court has reasoned, “[c]onditions on federal
grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs.”155 However, since Dole, the
prong has been held “toothless, even nonjusticiable.”156 Further, “[i]n
most instances in which the requirement has been a focus of litigation,
the court has done little more than assert, without analysis or elaboration,
that the challenged condition is ‘reasonably related to the federal interest

147. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
148. Id. at 208 (stating “the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of
the main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel”). The
rationale behind this connection is that “[a]chieving uniformity in minimum legal drinking
ages would . . . induce[] young people to drive to border states with lower drinking ages and
because, even within a single state, the higher the minimum drinking age, the fewer the
accidents per mile driven.”
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 31 (2001).
149. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
150. The Court in Dole spoke of a coercion limitation on the government’s spending
power in dicta but never adopted a rule. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted “[o]ur decisions have
recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion” but he did not extend
a bright line rule as to when this occurs and did not include it in the four-pronged Dole test.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 5.
151. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 2.
152. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to
Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 466 (2002).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (1987) (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S.
444, 461 (1978)).
156. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 466.
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in the national program.’”157 This has resulted in the Court upholding a
wide range of federal spending programs without establishing a clear
correlation.158
1. Rationalizing the “Germaneness Prong” of the Dole Test
The proposed condition—state compliance with Federal Minimum
Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines—would easily satisfy the
relaxed nature of the Dole test. In utilizing the Dole analysis, the only
prong of the test that needs further clarification is the above mentioned
germaneness prong. In Dole, the Court refused to set the outer bounds
of this limitation.159 For the scope of this proposal, the Medicaid grant
must be at least rationally related to the cemetery industry.160 While this
is the most restrictive of the Dole requirements, the Court does not
expect a perfect means-end fit in deriving the relationship.161
Medicaid is a federal categorical grant,162 which has a narrow scope
of eligible state expenses.163 Since its inception in 1965, it has been a
necessary and important form of assistance for families requiring longterm care.164 The Medicaid grant is substantially related to the cemetery
industry under two theories. First, Medicaid offers eligibility set-asides
for burial services. Second, Medicaid funds a state-run hospice program
that offers after-death and end-of-life services.

157. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 466.
158. Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 469.
159. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09.
160. Id. at 207-08 (noting that case law has indicated “that conditions on federal grants
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs’”) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
161. Id.
162. Advanced Funeral Planning for Baby Boomers: Medicaid Considerations,
DIGNITY MEMORIAL, http://www.dignitymemorial.com/dm20/en_US/main/dm/library/article/
name/preplanning-medicaid (last visited May 14, 2014).
163. BEN CANADA, CONG. RES. SERV., RS20669, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: OVERVIEW AND CHARACTERISTICS 3-4 (2002), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs1102/m1/1/high_res_d/RS20669_2000Sep07.p
df (explaining “[c]ategorical grants have a narrow range of eligible activities, permitting funds
to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes. Discretion over the awarding of
grants remains at the federal level since Congress defines the categories and federal agencies
review applications”).
164. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA:
A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 51-53 (1974).
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a. The Medicaid Eligibility Set-Aside for Burials and Burial Services
To be eligible for Medicaid, applicants over a set income level must
spend-down their assets until they reach a qualifying level.165 However,
certain assets are considered allowances or set-asides under the
Medicaid program rules.166 The federal Medicaid statute requires that
financial eligibility rules correspond to the Social Security
Administration’s Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).167 SSI
explicitly excludes, “the value of any burial space or agreement.”168 The
program regulations require that burial funds up to $1,500 be excluded
from assets.169
For the purposes of Medicaid, a “burial fund”170 is a sum of money
set-aside and clearly designated to pay for an eligible individual’s burial
expenses or the burial expenses171 of that individual’s spouse.172 The
fund must be held separate from other household accounts and labeled
for its purpose.173 The limit to this fund is $1,500; however, states may
allow more than this amount to be excluded.174 Payments are made
directly to the cemetarian upon the submission of particular forms.175
Burial items covered usually include goods such as “casket[s], urn[s],
mausoleum[s], vault[s], headstone[s] or plaque[s] . . . [and] the cost of
opening and closing of the gravesite.”176
In addition to the burial fund allowance, a Medicaid recipient may

165. Id.
166. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012) (stating, “[i]n determining the resources of an
individual, the value of burial spaces for the individual, the individual’s spouse or any member
of the individual’s immediate family will be excluded from resources”).
167. Todd A. Krichmar, Prepayment of Funeral Expenses for Medicaid and SSI
Recipients, 69 N.Y. ST. B. J. 42, 43 (1997).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (a)(2)(B) (2012); see also § 1382a(b)(16) (requiring
disregard from SSI income calculation any interest accrued on a burial arrangement).
169. See id § 1382b (a)(2)(B).
170. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012).
171. See id. (defining “burial spaces to include, burial plots, gravesites, crypts,
mausoleums, urns, niches and other customary and traditional repositories for the deceased’s
bodily remains provided such spaces are owned by the individual or are held for his or her
use.” Further, the term also includes improvements upon burial spaces “including, but not
limited to, vaults, headstones, markers, plaques, or burial containers and arrangements for
opening and closing the gravesite for burial of the deceased”).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Evelyn Frank Legal Resources Program, Paying for Burial— Tips for Qualifying
for Medicaid or SSI Despite “Excess Resources,” (Aug. 16, 2010), http://wnylc.com/health/afi
le/46/34/.
176. Id.
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also own a burial space without consequence to eligibility. This is
typically calculated at free market value.177 Thus, by the Government
allowing a set-aside for burial expenses, it is allowing eligible members
to maintain or hold in trust, funds that would otherwise disqualify them
from Medicaid.
b. The Medicaid Hospice Benefit and “After Death” Services
Under the Dole germaneness prong,178 the inquiry into the
relatedness of the condition and the grant is highly deferential to
Congress.179 Thus, “if any reasonable relationship between the policy
goals of a program and the policy goals of the grant condition can be
discerned, then the grant condition will be upheld.”180 The federal
Medicaid statute allows states to provide Hospice services for
terminally-ill patients.181 To date, nearly every state has elected to
provide the Hospice Benefit.182 Traditionally, Hospice care offers “a
team-oriented approach to expert medical care, pain management, and
emotional and spiritual support expressly tailored to the patient’s needs
and wishes.”183 The concept was developed to ensure that patients die
with respect and dignity.184 Among other services, Hospice care offers
bereavement services and after-death planning.185
As part of the Hospice Benefit provided by Medicaid, the
regulations provide that a team will care for and comfort the Medicaid

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1987).
Baker & Berman, supra note 152, at 463.
KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 12 (2012).
181. Lainie Rutkow, Optional or Optimal?: The Medicaid Hospice Benefit at Twenty,
22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2005).
182. Jane Tilly & Joshua M. Weiner, End-of-Life Care in the United States, 3 INT. J.
INTEGR. CARE 3 (2003) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1483949/
#r6 (noting “Every state but Connecticut, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota covered hospice under Medicaid [by] 2001”).
183. NATIONAL HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE CARE: A
CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO SELECTING A HOSPICE PROGRAM 2 (2009) available at
http://www.caringinfo.org/files/public/brochures/Hospice_Care.pdf (noting that Hospice care
“[s]upport is extended to the patient’s loved ones, as well. At the center of hospice is the belief
that each of us has the right to die pain-free and with dignity”).
184. Id. Hospice is generally used for “End-of-life care—the period of time when
patients are seriously ill with the condition that will cause their death.” See Tilly & Weiner,
supra note 182, at 1.
185. Dianne Rosen, A Hospice Primer, N.J. LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 12 (noting
that hospice care includes bereavement counseling for family members after the patient dies).
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patient.186 The team consists of a primary physician who is responsible
for overseeing medical care and identifying signs of death; a Hospice
physician who controls pain and provides end of life care; a nurse who
visits the patient daily and provides on-call services; a home health aide;
a social worker who makes funeral and burial arrangements and acts as a
liaison for the patient and the Department of Health and Human
Services; and a chaplain who provides after-death grief counseling to the
patient’s family.187
Since Medicaid allows states to use federal funds for a Hospice
Benefit, and the Hospice team is expected to support a patient during his
or her final moments by preparing for burial services and grief
counseling, there is a substantial relationship between the funds covered
by Medicaid and the cemetery industry. Since Medicaid covers this
expense, withholding funds for state non-compliance with the proposed
Guidelines is reasonably connected to the original purpose of the grant.
Further, it is directly in line with the mission of Hospice: to ensure that
patients die with respect and dignity. Federal coverage of the Hospice
Program shows that Medicaid is already covering services that extend
into the death care and cemetery industries.
In similar cases where the Supreme Court has analyzed the
“substantial relation” of federal conditions to a funding source, the
relationships have been much more attenuated, but faced no scrutiny
from the Court. For example, American Civil Liberties Union v.
Mineta188 held that “under the case law . . . the connection between the
funding restriction and the purpose of the funding does not have to
be . . . closely related to withstand a challenge.”189 Similar to the
relationship between the conditions at question in Dole, a requirement
that states lose a portion of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs
is permissible since it is related to the federal interest in maintaining the
health and welfare of bereaved consumers.
B. Conceptualizing the Federal-State Relationship: Limitations to
Conditional Spending Established in NFIB v. Sebelius
While the proposed Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines fit

186. See 42 U.S.C § 1395x (2013) (stating that the Medicaid Hospice Benefit has an
interdisciplinary group of personnel which—“includes at least— one physician . . . one
registered professional nurse, and . . . one social worker . . . and also includes at least one
pastoral or other counselor”).
187. Id.
188. 319 F. Supp. 2d 69, 79 (D.D.C. 2004).
189. Id. at 80.
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squarely within the limitations set forth in Dole,190 the fractured opinion
in NFIB established that the government’s spending power is greatly
limited when the terms of pre-existing spending programs are
“substantially and unforeseeably altered.”191 Under this new approach,
the Court focuses on coercion rather than compulsion.192 This is a
dramatic re-conceptualization of the prior anti-commandeering doctrine
and essentially redefines what constitutes a federal command to the
states.193
Looking through the lens of the Tenth Amendment194 and the anticommandeering principle, the plurality determined the Medicaid
expansion provision at issue in NFIB to be unconstitutional.195 The
Medicaid expansion provision aimed to cover individuals not included in
existing Medicaid coverage groups including “the entire nonelderly
population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.”196 The
ultimate goal of the expansion was to reduce the number of uninsured
Americans by expanding overall access to affordable healthcare.197
In an attempt to entice states to participate in the conditional
expansion provision, section 1396c of the Act gave the Secretary of
Health and Human Services the express authority to “penalize States that
choose not to participate in [the Medicaid expansion] . . . by taking away
their existing Medicaid funding.”198 In other words, a state’s failure to
adopt the provision would result in the complete withdrawal of all
Medicaid funding. While the expansion provision was upheld, the Court
struck the condition that states adopt the provision or lose all Medicaid
funding.199

190. See supra Section III.A; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
191. James F. Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated
Medicaid Expansion: The Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, CATO SUP. CT. REV.
67 (2012).
192. Margaret Hu, Reverse Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 554 (2012)
(nothing “even when Congress does not compel states to act, a law can be struck on anticommandeering grounds if the practical impact of the law is one that coerces another
sovereign’s power”).
193. Id. at 554-55 (noting that after NFIB the anti-commandeering principle has
transformed into an “anti-coercion” principle).
194. U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, no prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
People.”).
195. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012).
196. Id.
197. John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court’s Ruling
and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 No. 6 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2012).
198. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2574-75. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
199. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2574-75.
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NFIB invites a vast array of new coercion challenges to federal
conditional spending programs, yet the Court refused to articulate a
bright line test for identifying the level of command that would
constitute coercion. Chief Justice Roberts set out key factors to
determine whether a Spending Clause action is repugnant to the Tenth
Amendment. According to Professor Eloise Pasachoff,200 factor one has
two inquiries.201 Under the first inquiry, the government must identify
whether the proposed condition is a new and independent program.202
Under the second, a determination must be made as to whether states had
clear notice of any modifications made to an existing conditional
spending program.203 This means the federal government cannot
unexpectedly alter a grant program by conditioning the receipt of
existing funds on compliance with a “new” program. Finally, factor two
posits whether the condition is so coercive as to hold “a gun to the
head[s]” of states.204 This means the threat of withdrawing the funds
cannot be so significant as to constitute “economic dragooning.”205
According to the plurality, these factors destroy any “real choice” a state
may have in accepting a grant condition and, as a result, commandeer
state authority under the Spending Clause.206
This Note argues that the most effective reading of the NFIB test is
not to read the above factors as independently operative, but as
conjunctive.207 For example, Professor Pasachoff describes the NFIB
Test as follows:
Does the condition in question threaten to take away funds for a
program that is separate and independent from the program to which
the condition in question is attached? [If no, the inquiry stops and the
condition is upheld.][If so,] . . . did the states have sufficient notice at
the time they accepted funds for the first program that they would
also have to comply with the second program? [If yes, the inquiry
stops.][If not,] . . . is the amount of funding at stake so significant

200. Eloise Pasachoff is an Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. Her academic profile is available at: http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/pas
achoff-eloise.cfm.
201. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of
Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 593 (2013).
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
204. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604; Pasachoff, supra note 202 at 593.
205. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
206. Id.
207. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 593.
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that the threat to withdraw it constitutes “economic dragooning?”

208

The below sections analyze each prong of the NFIB test and
reiterates Professor Pasachoff’s rationale as it relates to the cemetery
industry.
1. New Programs and Independent Grants
While it is clear from the NFIB plurality that conditioning the
receipt of existing federal funding on compliance with a new program
may be coercive, there is little guidance from the Court as to when a
condition ultimately transforms an existing program into a “new
program.”209 In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts and the plurality reasoned
that the Medicaid expansion provision was “a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”210 This shift sought to establish “a comprehensive national plan
to provide universal health insurance coverage”211 rather than a program
to cover only four categories of individuals as originally established.212
Under this rationale, the proposed expansion to Medicaid was
extremely broad and transformed the program by making it almost
universal.213 However, mere alterations or expansions on a smaller level
may not rise to a “shift in kind.”214 For example, in Dole the condition
“was imposed on a separate, independent program, and there were no
new funds attached to that condition.”215 The Court reasoned that in
Dole, the condition was reasonably foreseeable and did not expand the
program in such a transformative way.216
Upon a determination that a condition threatens to terminate
existing funds, the next inquiry “is whether the states had notice at the
time they first accepted funding under the first program that they would
also have to comply with the second program.”217 If adequate notice was
provided, then the anti-commandeering principle does not apply and
there is no Tenth Amendment violation.218 However, “[i]f the states did
not have proper notice, then the question becomes whether the terms of

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-05; Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599 (quoting NFIB, 132 S.Ct at 2605-06).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2575; see also Pasachoff, supra note 202, at 600.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01.
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the financial inducement constitute economic dragooning.”219
2. Clear Notice of Contractual Terms
Many legal scholars support the notion that the Spending Clause
establishes a contractual relationship between the federal government
and each individual state.220 In this situation, the government is the
offeror and the state is the offeree, bound only by acceptance of the
terms.221 This contractual framework serves as a protective measure to
safeguard states’ ability to opt out or refrain from participating in federal
programs.222 NFIB reaffirmed that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’
exercise of the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”223 Thus, states must
have reasonable notice of the terms of the new condition.
However, the Court makes little inquiry as to what satisfies this
“reasonable notice” requirement. In NFIB, the plurality reasoned that
the states lacked clear notice of the Medicaid expansion provision
because states could not reasonably expect the program to be modified
or expanded in such a broad manner.224 In coming to this rationale,
Chief Justice Roberts strictly interpreted the rule of Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman.225 He reasoned, when states first
enroll in a federal grant program, Congress must provide reasonable
notice of conditions that might later be imposed.226 Professor Pasachoff
contends that Chief Justice Roberts’ notice requirement hinges on the
conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was a separate program from the
existing grant.227
Thus, “[t]he notice the plurality actually required, then, is not notice
of any change to the program Congress might make in the future, but
notice that the states would have to participate in a separate, independent
program if they want to participate in the first program.”228 There was
no indication from the plurality that a state must be aware of all future

219. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 600-01. “Economic dragooning” is discussed infra
Part III.B.3.
220. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58
DUKE L.J. 345, 391 (2008); see also Staples, supra note 122, at 358.
221. Id. at 386.
222. Id. at 386.
223. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 591 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 ).
224. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 591.
225. See 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
226. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012).
227. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602.
228. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602.
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conditions that could be placed on the grant at the time the program is
first implemented.229
At the inception of the Medicaid Act, states “signed on” with the
knowledge that Congress reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal
any provision of [Medicaid].”230 In fact, the Medicaid program has been
altered on numerous occasions without facing viable constitutional
challenges.231 For example, new conditions have been imposed on the
existing grant money in the past, yet no immense questioning was
warranted by the Court.232 Said amendments were viewed as mere
modifications.
Under the authorization provision above, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the federal government gave notice that “mere
alterations” could be made to the existing program.233
3. State Participation in Cooperative Federalism: Economic
Dragooning and the “Real Choice” Test
The second prong of the NFIB test establishes yet another limitation
on Congress’s spending power.234 Here the Court considered the
ramifications of the government inducing states’ compliance with federal
spending programs through financial enticement.235 Under Professor
Pasachoff’s reasoning, this prong is triggered “only if the condition in
question threaten[s] to take away funds from an independent program

229. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 602. Professor Pasachoff draws a comparison
between NFIB and Dole. Concerning Dole she notes:
There is no chance that when states took funds under that Act in 1982 they could
have foreseen that a 1984 law would require them to raise their drinking age or lose
some NFIB funding under the Act. Yet the plurality did not conclude that the
subsequent amendment was therefore coercive.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 603.
230. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part); 42 U.S.C. § 1304
(2013).
231. See Thomas, supra note 180, at 13 (noting “[m]any of the amendments to
Medicaid imposed grant conditions that, if not met, would result in the loss of all Medicaid
funding . . . . [for example] the various Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1381–
1382, 1465 (extending Medicaid eligibility, but partly conditioning only the new funding);
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388–166 (extending
eligibility, and conditioning old and new funds)”).
232. Thomas, supra note 180, at 13.
233. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
234. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 46 (noting the “anti-coercion principle operates as a
limit on Congress's power to spend for the general welfare when conditions are placed on
states' acceptance of that spending. The Court has previously recognized structural limits on
other federal powers, but NFIB was the first clear articulation of a federalism-based limit on
Congress's spending power” (citation omitted)).
235. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211
(1987)).
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and if that condition [was] added after the state[] first joined the original
program.”236 While previous case law has recognized challenges based
on coercion—the language was left only in dicta.237 The plurality’s
decision in NFIB marked the first time in history the Court
acknowledged coercion as more than a “theoretical possibility”238 under
the Spending Clause. As a result, a new framework for coercion analysis
was established.239 This framework sets forth a series of interconnected
factors that the Court used to find the all-or-nothing condition attached
to the Medicaid expansion provision coercive.
First, as independent sovereigns, states must be given a real choice
whether or not to accept a government condition on a federal grant.240 In
the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts determined “[t]he threatened
loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget is economic
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in
the Medicaid expansion.”241 Roberts further stated “[i]n this case, the
financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”242 If states do
not have a true choice to refrain from the imposed condition, then the
spending condition is in violation of the Tenth Amendment and is
coercive.243
Second, the Court looked at the percentage of individual state
budgets that would be affected by the condition. After NFIB, it is clear
that “all-or-nothing” provisions, under which states stand to lose all

236. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 605.
237. See Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 46-47 (noting “[t]he Rehnquist Court bypassed
several opportunities to recognize a Tenth Amendment [coercion] limit in direct Spending
Clause challenges such as Dole and New York v. United States”). For example, “Rehnquist
recognized that ‘in some circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might
be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” Huberfeld,
supra note 131, at 46-47.
238. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 577; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part).
239. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 577. The Dole Court spoke of coercion noting,
“[b]ut to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical
determinism by which choice becomes impossible.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S 548, 590 (1937)).
240. Pasachoff, supra note 202, at 592.
241. NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2604 (plurality opinion) (comparing the five percent condition
accepted in Dole as mere “mild encouragement” to the threatened loss of all Medicaid funds,
which constitutes over 10% of some states’ overall budgets).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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existing funding, will be labeled as coercive.244 However, what is less
clear is what percentage of affected funding rises to the level of
coercion. For example, no case conditioning less than “all-or-nothing”
has ever been struck down by the Court for being coercive.245 Professor
Pasachoff notes, “the effect of the federal funding on the state budget is
key.”246 However, Chief Justice Roberts and the plurality did not give
bright line numbers or levels under which conditions on funding would
rise to coercion.
In fact, the only direction for future cases is based on an
amalgamation of case law beginning with Dole.247 In Dole, only onepercent of South Dakota’s budget was affected.248 There, the
inducement was characterized explicitly as “relatively mild
encouragement.”249 At the other end of the spectrum, in NFIB, many
states would have faced a ten percent state budget cut. Thus, Professor
Pasachoff explains, “[f]or both the plurality and joint dissent, . . . the line
for financial inducement that crosses the line to coercion is a threatened
loss [to state budgets of] somewhere between less than 1% and as much
as 10% of a state’s overall annual expenditures.”250
Chief Justice Roberts stated, “[t]he size of the new financial burden
imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the State has been
coerced into accepting that burden. ‘Your money or your life’ is a
coercive proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket or
$500.”251 This statement posits that it is a judicial decision as to whether
a particular grant condition is coercive and in violation of the Tenth
Amendment.252 The focus is on the bottom line and not the actual dollar
amount.
Finally, the Court looks at political accountability in limiting

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 605 (referring to the plurality opinion and noting that
20% of the average state’s budget goes to Medicaid payments, “with the federal government
covering 50 to 83% of those payments”).
247. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 606 (quoting the plurality in NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at
2604).
248. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 204 (1987).
249. Id. at 211.
250. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 606 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605).
251. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at n.12.
252. Id. at 2606-07. The Roberts plurality relies on Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis in its
decision to refrain from establishing a bright line test to determine what constitutes coercion.
301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937). In that case, the Court determined that it did not know where the
line fell, but the statute in question was well within it. Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts also
refrained from establishing a bright line rule.
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expansive congressional authority.253
For example, “[w]here all
Congress has done is to ‘encourag[e] state regulation rather than
compe[l] it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people. [But]
where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.’”254
Even after the NFIB decision, distinguishing enticement versus
coercion is difficult. The dissent stated, “[c]ourts should not conclude
that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground unless the coercive
nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”255
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MINIMUM GRIEVING
CONSUMER PROTECTION GUIDELINES UNDER THE NFIB
TEST

It is likely the proposed condition would survive a facial
constitutional challenge. Both the plurality and the joint dissent
reaffirmed that Congress can use its spending power to entice states to
enact certain government policies or programs.
However, the
256
government may not compel or coerce states to act.
This proposal
seeks to condition an “appropriate percentage” of the Medicaid grant on
state compliance with the Minimum Guidelines. This Section applies
the NFIB analysis (as presented by Professor Pasachoff ) to this proposal
and demonstrates there are no Tenth Amendment limitations barring the
implementation of the Guidelines.
A. Does the Implementation of Federal Minimum Grieving
Consumer Protection Guidelines “Threaten to Take Away Funds
for a Program That Is Separate and Independent from the
Program to Which the Condition in Question is Attached?”257
As mentioned above, “the plurality [in NFIB] began by
distinguishing between two types of spending conditions that Congress
might conceivably impose: conditions on the use of federal funds and
conditions that threaten to take away federal funds for other
programs.”258
The latter type of condition is now considered

253.
254.
(1992)).
255.
256.
257.
258.

Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 65.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168
Id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 583.
Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596.
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“constitutionally suspect” under NFIB and warrants a coercion
analysis.259 The implementation of Minimum Grieving Consumer
Protection Guidelines cannot fairly be read as a “new and
independent”260 program under the NFIB rationale.
While the
implementation of the Guidelines does condition the receipt of existing
Medicaid funds on state acceptance of the Guidelines, the proposed
implementation mirrors the condition at stake in Dole.261
Further, the implementation would not jettison the ultimate purpose
of Medicaid—to provide healthcare “to the neediest among us.”262
Instead, the proposed Guidelines would merely modify the grant in ways
no more expansive than other historical modifications.263 For example,
the plurality noted “[t]he original [Medicaid] program was designed to
cover medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent
children. Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered
and expanded the boundaries of these categories.”264 Chief Justice
Roberts found the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expansion went beyond a
mere expansion and was an attempt to provide “a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”265
The proposed Guidelines, on the other hand, simply seek to expand
upon services for the Medically Needy and the Aged categories.266 The
Medicaid program would remain unified even after the implementation
of the Guidelines. The burial eligibility exception267 and the Hospice
Benefit268 demonstrate that the scope of Medicaid already encourages
after-life services and care for the Aged and Medically Needy categories
of Medicaid recipients. Given that Medicaid already pays for burial
planning through its regulation of Hospice teams, including social
workers and bereavement counselors,269 it is not unreasonable that
Medicaid funding cover state expenses to eradicate cemetery
misfeasance. The additional proposed regulation is minimal, and as

259. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 596.
260. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594.
261. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 594.
262. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012).
263. See Blumstein, supra note 191 (noting the various accepted changes to the
Medicaid Program).
264. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (citation omitted).
265. Id. at 2606.
266. See infra App. A.
267. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1231 (2012).
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (2013).
269. See id.
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such, could not be said to cause “a shift in kind.”270
If a condition merely alters the outer boundaries of previously
existing statutes, “the more likely it is that the change works no shift in
kind.”271 Alternatively, the more a condition can be said to change “a
program by exploding the concept of statutory categories or by making
those statutory categories so broad that they start to become
‘comprehensive’ or ‘universal,’ the more likely it is that the change is a
shift in kind rather than degree.”272 However, if a court were to
determine the proposed Guidelines constitute a new and independent
program (or a shift in kind), then the court would move to the next
question. 273
B. “[D]id the States Have Sufficient Notice at the Time They
Accepted Funds for the First Program That They Would Also
Have to Comply with the Second Program?”274
Once a program condition is found to be a “new and independent
program,” the question turns to whether the notice of the condition was
accurate and whether it was accepted knowingly and voluntarily.275 The
NFIB plurality noted that “[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under
the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising participating
States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”276
In 1965, when states signed on to the Medicaid program, there was
a clause reserving for Congress “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any
provision” of that statute.277 Agreeing to this provision, “each State
expressly undertook to abide by future Medicaid changes.”278 Since
270. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. The Plurality left ambiguous what constitutes a “shift in
kind.”
271. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599.
272. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 599.
273. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 598.
274. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612.
275. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612.
276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (quoting
Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1980)).
277. See id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013)
(noting Congress has reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this
chapter”). “In Pennhurst, residents of a state-run, federally funded institution for the mentally
disabled complained of abusive treatment and inhumane conditions in alleged violation of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2637. The
Court held that the State was not liable because it did not “voluntarily and knowingly
accep[t]” the terms. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). The
take away rule from Pennhurst is “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” Id.
278. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1) (2011); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2639.
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then, “Congress has repeatedly amended and expanded Medicaid ‘with
both mandatory and optional features, often as part of broader policy
initiatives.’”279 Thus, it is well settled that if states have proper notice of
a condition from the outset, then it is unlikely it will be coercive under
the NFIB analysis.280
States must be able to foresee future alterations that Congress might
make. In 1985, Hospice Care was introduced as an optional Medicaidcovered benefit.281 While Medicaid was intended to cover health
services for society’s most needy, it is unlikely that states could foresee
that Medicaid would condition the receipt of a portion of existing
funding to ensure that cemeteries avoid misfeasance and ensure
consumer protections that have—until this proposal—remained
unregulated at the federal level. According to Professor Pasachoff, this
“simply means that the . . . inquiry should proceed to the third stage,
asking whether the financial inducements are so significant as to
constitute economic dragooning.”282
C. “Is the Amount of Funding at Stake So Significant That the
Threat to Withdraw It Constitutes Economic Dragooning?”283
In NFIB, the Court inquired whether “the financial inducement
offered by Congress [was] so coercive as to pass the point at which
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”284 As mentioned above, the plurality
did not elaborate or set a bright line test as to when pressure becomes
compulsion.285 To overcome this hurdle, the proposal at hand seeks to
condition an appropriate percentage of the Medicaid grant on state
compliance with Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines.
This is done to essentially model the proposal set-forth in Dole. Since
the drinking age condition in Dole targeted one percent of the state
budget and the Medicaid expansion provision threatened a loss of ten
percent of individual state budgets, it is likely the proposed appropriate
percentage would fall somewhere in between. This proposal is vastly
different from the Medicaid expansion provision, which threatened
100% of existing Medicaid funding.

279. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 21.
280. Huberfeld, supra note 131, at 21.
281. Rutkow, supra note 181, at 11.
282. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 603.
283. Pasachoff, supra note 201, at 612.
284. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
285. Id.
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This proposal is much closer to the “mild encouragement”
rationalized in Dole.286 While some portion of funding will be lost if
states choose not to comply, such a small percentage is at stake that
states are still left with a “real choice” whether to participate. Under the
rationale set-forth by Professor Pasachoff, the above test should be read
conjunctively.287 This means the proposed grant condition must fail both
the notice inquiry as well as the economic dragooning test to be
unconstitutionally coercive. Thus, it is likely the implementation of the
proposed Minimum Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines would
survive a facial constitutional challenge.
V.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: ATTACHING THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL CONDITION TO THE BURIAL ELIGIBILITY
ALLOWANCE

This Note proposes that as an alternative to attaching the proposed
condition to an appropriate percentage of the Medicaid grant—the
federal government should attach the condition to the individual receipt
of the Medicaid eligibility allowance provision for burial spaces and
burial funds.288
This means individual Medicaid recipients who
patronize cemeteries deemed non-compliant with the proposed federal
guidelines will be ineligible to receive the eligibility set-asides and will
have to spend-down income in other ways to meet the asset limit and
maintain Medicaid eligibility. Part A of this Section explains the
relationship between the “Medically Needy” category of Medicaid
recipients and the Medicaid eligibility set-aside for burial goods and
services. Part B of this Section offers a comprehensive analysis of the
policy implications and rationale behind the proposal. Finally, Part C of
this Section compares this proposal to similar cases that were deemed
constitutional.
A. The “Medically Needy” Category as a Means of Regulating the
Cemetery Industry
Typically only the “Medically Needy” category of Medicaid
recipients will have to spend-down assets to become eligible for the
program.289 Recipients in this category usually have high medical
expenses, as well as incomes that exceed the maximum allowed
286. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
287. Pasachoff, supra note 201.
288. See supra Part II.A.1.
289. Alison Barnes, An Assessment of Medicaid Planning, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 265, 271 (2003).

KADY S. HUFF

470

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:437

threshold.290 For example, “[e]lderly [people] living in nursing homes
and children and adults with disabilities who live in the community and
incur high healthcare costs comprise a large portion of spending in the
medically needy program.”291 In fiscal year 2009,292 there were
approximately 2.8 million enrollees in this category, resulting in over 36
billion-dollars in federal Medicaid funding.293 The medically needy
option is complicated for potential members to navigate.294 It is
generally thought to provide an important safety net for people whose
medical costs greatly exceed their incomes.295 As a result, the ability to
spend-down is very important for these individuals.296
While Medicaid allows for various set-asides in determining
eligibility,297 the exception relevant to this Note is the value of burial
items up to $1,500. It is important to note that states are permitted to use
less restrictive methodologies in counting resources under the medically
needy program, but they may not be more restrictive.298 This means
some states allow a set-aside of more than $1,500, but all states are
required to allow at least that amount.299 Further, in conjunction with the
burial fund allowance, the value of a burial space or an agreement with a
cemetarian representing the value of a burial space is also excluded from
the claimant’s countable resources.300 Only one plot per individual
member may be excluded.301
B. Rationale Behind Penalizing the Individual Rather Than the
State
The underlying policy implication behind this proposal is that
Medicaid recipients, who account for approximately sixty-seven million
individuals in the United States, will be incentivized to enter into
290. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID
MEDICALLY NEEDY PROGRAM: SPENDING AND ENROLLMENT UPDATE 1 (2012), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/4096.pdf
[hereinafter
Kaiser
Comm’n].
291. Id.
292. Id. 2009 is the most recent survey date.
293. Id. at 16.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b (2012).
300. Id.
301. Other exclusions include: the value of the potential member’s home, personal
effects, and an automobile. See id.
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business relationships with cemeteries that comply with the Minimum
Grieving Consumer Protection Guidelines. Knowing members will be
over the eligibility asset limit; they will avoid non-compliant cemeteries
and opt for cemeteries that follow the proposed federal guidelines. This
proposal would side-step the NFIB test because it does not materially
alter the existing Medicaid program. It has long been understood that
Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare. However,
Congress also has the authority to attach conditions to the funds that the
recipient must accept to receive the funds.302 As opposed to the entire
program, this second proposal seeks to attach the condition to the
individual’s choice of cemeteries.
While Congress has this authority, there is a fine line between
compelling and incentivizing individuals to act in a certain way. Neither
the Commerce Clause, nor the Spending Clause gives Congress the
authority to compel individuals to engage in commerce. However, by
incentivizing individuals to patronize cemeteries that comply with
federal guidelines, the federal government is regulating a market in
which citizens freely decided to engage. Medicaid members have the
option to embrace the condition. This proposal would not be so coercive
as to “hold a gun” to the individual’s head because even those who
become ineligible for the burial allowance may spend-down income
through other allowances. Thus, they are afforded many more options
than states affected by the all-or-nothing approach in NFIB.
C. Attaching Condition to the Individual: A Look at Prior Case
Law
The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that Congress
can condition federal funds on actions of individuals and individual
businesses. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that the Government could selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest.303 He
further noted, “[w]hen the Government appropriates public funds to
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”304
However, Chief Justice Roberts limited this notion in NFIB. He
noted:
Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States
to act in accordance with federal policies. But when “pressure turns

302. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).
303. 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991).
304. Id. at 194.
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into compulsion,” the legislation runs contrary to our system of
federalism . . . .“The Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the States to regulate.” That is true whether
Congress directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces
305
a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.

Both NFIB and Dole rationalize the federal-state relationship
concerning the Spending Clause.
However, Spending Clause
jurisprudence also allows Congress to attach conditions to the individual
or businesses in their individual capacities.
For example, in Steward,306 the Court determined that “[an]
unemployment compensation scheme offered as an option to the states,
which was designed to induce the states to enact conforming legislation
for private employees, did not violate the Tenth Amendment because the
states were not coerced into adopting the legislation.”307 Similar to the
Steward decision, the proposal at hand seeks to offer the Medicaid
eligibility set-aside only to those potential recipients who patronize
cemeteries in compliance with the proposed rules. This seeks to induce
cemetarians to comply with the proposed guidelines as well as
individuals to utilize only those cemeteries deemed to be in compliance.
Like Steward, there is nothing in this proposal that suggest an “exertion
of power akin to undue influence . . . .”308
VI. CONCLUSION
As William Shakespeare said “[t]he evil that men do lives after
them; . . . [t]he good is oft interred with their bones.”309 The cemetery
industry is left as one of the few unregulated industries in the United
States. Thus, consumers should not blindly rely on cemetery providers
to implement adequate consumer price protections. As mentioned, the
industry has shifted from selling grave plots—to a vast array of funeral
goods and services.310 Both Congress and the FTC have recognized the
conditions within the industry that make it susceptible misfeasance, but
have failed to provide bereaved consumers with an adequate remedy.
305. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992)).
306. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
307. Los Angeles County, Cal. v. Marshall, 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (D.D.C. 1977)
(emphasis omitted); see also Steward 301 U.S. at 548.
308. Steward, 301 U.S. at 590; see also Marshall, 442 F. Supp. at 1190.
309. Act 3, Scene 2, THE LITERATURE NETWORK, http://www.online-literature.com/sha
kespeare/julius_caesar/10/ (last visited May 20, 2014).
310. See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry
Practices, 64 Fed. Reg. 35965 (July 2, 1999).
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The potential for another Burr Oak scandal continues to exist and reports
of misconduct continue to surface.311
If every state adopted comprehensive consumer protection
regulations, like those promulgated by Iowa, the probability of
misconduct would diminish significantly. Because states have chosen
not to do so, it is the federal government’s duty to act. With the new test
set forth in NFIB, it is likely that both of the proposed conditional
spending programs would survive a facial constitutional challenge.
Kady S. Huff

∗

311. See generally News One, Families Claim Relatives’ Bodies Lost in Cemetery
Scheme, CHICAGODEFENDER (Jan. 30, 2014), http://chicagodefender.com/2014/01/30/families
-claim-relatives-bodies-lost-in-cemetery-scheme/.
J.D. Western New England University School of Law, 2014. Editor-in-Chief, Volume
36, Western New England Law Review. I would like to Thank Professors Jeanne Kaiser and
Bruce Miller for their thoughts and ideas on this Note. I would also like to thank the Western
New England Law Review Editorial Board and Staff for their hard work and dedication this
year.
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APPENDIX A:
PROPOSED MINIMUM GRIEVING CONSUMER PROTECTION GUIDELINES312
A. PRICE DISCLOSURES:313 It shall be an unfair or deceptive act for cemetarians
or cemetery providers to fail to:
1. Furnish accurate price information disclosing the cost to the purchaser
for each of the specific goods and services used in connection with the
disposition of deceased human bodies, including:
i. The price of embalming;
ii. transportation of remains;
iii. use of facilities including mausoleums;
iv. caskets;
v. outer burial containers;
vi. immediate burials; or
vii. direct cremations.
2. Provide accurate price information including the cost of the burial plot
and any other cemetery expenses to:
i. Persons who inquire in person about cemetery and
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines
and any other readily available information that
reasonably answers the question;
ii. Persons who inquire via telephone about cemetery and
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines
and any other readily available information that
reasonably answers the question
iii. Persons who inquire via e-mail or other forms of
electronic communication about cemetery and cemetery
expenses and offerings or prices including those goods
and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines and any
other readily available information that reasonably
answers the question;
iv. All other person who inquire about cemetery and
cemetery expenses and offerings or prices including those
goods and services in Section A(1) of these guidelines
and any other readily available information that

312. Note: these guidelines are a compilation and adaptation of the cited sources and
seek to serve as a representative, but not comprehensive, example of the consumer protections
that are missing from the cemetery industry.
313. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (2013).
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reasonably answers the question.
B. GENERAL PRICE LIST:314 It shall be an unfair or deceptive act for
cemetarians or cemetery providers to fail to:
1. Provide all consumers with a typewritten price list which clearly states
the prices of all caskets or alternative containers, as well as headstones,
burial plots, and other cemetery goods and services;
2. Provide consumers with said list prior to showing any casket, alternative
container, headstone, or other cemetery good or service;
3. Provide an adequate General Price List which includes:
i. The retail price of all cemetery goods and services for
sale including but not limited to caskets, alternative
containers, headstones, and burial plots;
ii. The price range for the immediate burials offered by the
funeral provider, together with:
iii. A separate price for an immediate burial where the
purchaser provides the casket;
iv. Separate prices for each immediate burial offered
including a casket or alternative container;
v. A description of the services and container (where
applicable) included in that price;
vi. Notation of items requiring special ordering
vii. The effective date of the price list
viii. The name, address, and contact information of the
cemetarians or cemetery provider
ix. Identification of the cemetarian’s place of business and
corporate affiliation if any.
C. MISREPRESENTATIONS:315 It shall be a deceptive act or practice for a
cemetery provider to;
1. Represent that state or local law requires outer-burial container when
such is not the case;
2. Represent that state or local law requires the purchase of other goods
and services when such is not the case;
3. Fail to disclose that particular cemetery goods and services are not
required by state or local law;
4. Represent that a deceased person is required to be embalmed for
immediate burial; or
5. Fail to provide a bereaved consumer with all written rules and

314. Id.
315. Id. § 453.3.
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regulations and a clear explanation in writing of the interment,
inurnment, or entombment right that has been purchased, and any
material terms and conditions of that purchase, including any
repurchase option by the cemetery or resale rights available to the
consumer.
LISTING OF OPENING AND CLOSING SERVICES: A cemetery shall disclose,
prior to the sale of interment rights, whether opening and closing of the
interment space is included in the purchase of the interment rights. If
opening and closing services are not included in the sale and the cemetery
offers opening and closing services, the cemetery must disclose that the
price for this service is subject to change and disclose the current prices for
opening and closing services provided by the cemetery.316
INTERMENT RIGHTS: A person owning interment rights may sell those rights
to third parties. The cemetery shall fully disclose, in the cemetery’s rules
and regulations, any requirements necessary to transfer title of interment
rights to a third party.317
CASH ADVANCE PROVISIONS: It shall be a deceptive act or practice for a
cemetery provider to:
1. Represent that the price charged for a cash advance item is the same as
the cost to the funeral provider for the item when such is not the case;
or
2. Fail to disclose to persons arranging funerals that the price being
charged for a cash advance item is not the same as the cost to the
cemetarian for the item when such is the case.
INSPECTIONS: All cemeteries shall be required to:
1. Retain all records in existence on the date of enactment of these
guidelines including maps or other systems indicating the location and
date of each interment, inurnment, or entombment;
2. Accurately record and retain records of all interments, inurnments, or
entombments occurring, as well as any internment, inurnment, or
entombment rights sold; and
3. Make such records available to Federal, State, and local governments, as
appropriate.
RETENTION OF DOCUMENTS:318 Cemetery providers must retain and make
available for inspection true and accurate:
1. Copies of the price lists specified in Section B of these guidelines;
2. Records detailing the name and contact information of all patrons of the

316. See IOWA CODE § 523I.301
317. See id. § 523I.301.
318. 16 C.F.R. § 453.6.
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cemetery including the date of inurnment, internment, or entombment.
3. Records detailing the contract information of patron indicating the price
they paid for their cemetery goods and services.
DECLARATION OF INTENT:319 It is a violation of these guidelines to engage
in any unfair or deceptive acts or practices specified herein or to fail to
comply with any of the preventive requirements so specified. The
provisions of this rule are separate and severable from one another. If any
provision is determined to be invalid, any remaining provisions shall
continue in effect.

319. 16 C.F.R. § 453.8.

